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Abstract 
To determine how public opinion matters for the politics of European integration, we need to know 
what Europeans say about Europe. Yet, despite a proliferation of analyses of public support for 
Europe, fundamental questions remain. First, does aggregate opinion reflect a single preference for 
Europe? Second, is the content of opinions similar across countries? Third, have opinions about 
Europe become more structured over time? Finally, what are the long-term dynamics in opinions 
about Europe? To answer these questions, we construct a new dataset of historical public opinion 
since 1952 in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Over the long run, aggregate 
opinion toward Europe reflects one dominant underlying dimension and its content is similar across 
countries. We examine the trends in support for Europe. 
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It is commonly assumed that public opinion matters to the process of European integration 
and to governing the European Union (EU). Journalistic and popular commentary about public 
sentiment is ubiquitous and often focused on whether support for Europe is high or low, on the rise 
or on the decline. Yet, despite decades of academic scholarship on public opinion about European 
integration, institutions, and policies, important conceptual and empirical questions remain. On a 
conceptual level, researchers have portrayed survey measures of support as a kind of system 
support or have simply taken them at face value. On an empirical level, more studies have focused 
on investigating individual-level differences in attitudes toward Europe than on examinng aggregate 
changes in opinion over time. This imbalance requires attention if we want to understand the 
politics of the Union, insofar as “[u]seful, and therefore consequential, opinion is aggregate. 
Politicians care about the views of states, districts, areas, cities, what-have-you [...]. For a politician 
to pay attention to individual views is to miss the main game” (Stimson, 1991: 12). 
To address these gaps, we seek to provide conceptual and empirical grounding for the study 
of public opinion about Europe. First, we argue that support for integration can be thought of as a 
simple preference for or against a supra-national Europe. Second, we develop a measure of support 
based on data collected in France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK) since the earliest 
days of the European project. Third, we subject this measure to several tests. Our analyses reveal 
that aggregate opinion is largely unidimensional in nature. Moreover, they show that public opinion 
in the UK is different from opinion in the other countries, both in level and trajectory. Trends in 
support for Europe show notable declines in France, Germany, and Italy over the course of several 
decades, while public opinion in the UK has been relatively stable – albeit at a lower level – when 
considered over the entire post-war period. 
 
Carts and horses: Public opinion and European integration 
In October 1954, on the heels of the London Nine Power Conference that formally ended 
the occupation of West Germany and granted it sovereignty and membership in the North Atlantic 
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Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States Information Agency (USIA) fielded a public 
opinion survey in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK to gauge Europeans’ attitudes about a variety 
of topics of interest to American policymakers. Soon after the end of World War II, USIA had 
begun to monitor Europeans’ opinions on various issues, including German re-unification and, as 
the Cold War was heating up, views about the Soviet Union, Communism, the use of nuclear 
weapons, and America’s role in Europe. 
The surveys also included questions about European unification. 1952 had seen the creation 
of European Coal and Steel Community, and the London Conference had paved the way for the 
creation of the Western European Union. USIA found that responses to the question “Are you, in 
general, for or against making efforts toward uniting West Europe?” were overwhelmingly positive: 
82% of West Germans embraced the idea, as did 78% of British respondents. Even in the countries 
that were slightly less enthusiastic (Italy and France), strong majorities (63%) were in favor of the 
idea. When asked whether they liked the idea of creating a European government to which national 
governments would delegate their powers, 78% of Germans were in favor; even the lowest level of 
support among national publics, found in the UK and France, came in at 55 and 56%, respectively. 
Clearly, the idea of a unified Europe was viewed positively across the major European states. 
 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
As the 1950s continued, so did the USIA’s program of surveying European publics. While 
primarily focused on Europeans’ views about the United States (U.S.) and conflict with the Soviet 
Union, the surveys also consistently asked people’s opinions about different aspects of European 
integration, with questions about unifying Europe and membership in European institutions 
(European Economic Community, Euratom) providing a common thread. Across countries and over 
time, a recognizable pattern to what people thought about Europe began to form, with German 
respondents expressing more positive views, and majorities across all countries in favor of the 
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European project. Moreover, as Figure 2 shows, a common trend seemed to emerge, with support 
declining across all four countries in 1955 only to recover in 1956. 
 
(Figure 2 here) 
 
What these patterns mean and how they matter have been long-standing questions in the 
debate over the integration process and the functioning of European institutions. Two stylized 
positions have dominated this debate. The earliest of these argued that public opinion was irrelevant 
to the elite-driven nature of the politics involved (Haas, 1968; see also Gaubatz, 1995). This 
perspective saw European integration as a matter of international relations, where domestic publics 
mattered little. 
Most scholarship has disagreed with these early functionalist perspectives. Transnationalist 
scholars, for instance, emphasized the importance of a “sense of community” for building a united 
Europe (Deutsch, et al. 1957; Etzioni, 1965; see also Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993), and scholars of 
international relations argued that opinion mattered through its influence on governments’ 
preferences (Moravcsik, 1998). A consensus emerged that public opinion indeed matters to the 
integration process because it both constrains elites and can be mobilized by them (Carrubba, 2001; 
Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Schmitt and Thomassen, 2000; Toshkov, 
2011; Wessels, 1995). 
 A second, related consensus has centered on the apparent structural break in support for the 
EU after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the treaty’s subsequent rejection in a 
referendum in Denmark. Across a number of member states, support peaked around this time. The 
subsequent downturn has been interpreted as signalling both the end of the so-called “permissive 
consensus” between elites forging greater integration and publics paying scant attention, as well as 
the beginning of a more contested Europe composed of more disagreeable publics (Down and 
Wilson, 2008; Eichenberg and Dalton, 2007). 
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These debates regarding the role of public opinion in the European integration process or in 
governing the EU are interesting, nuanced, and important. They also risk putting the cart before the 
horse. While commentary about opinions toward “Europe” is pervasive, studies that seek to 
measure and track long-term trends in public sentiment have been less common (for exceptions, see 
Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Bølstad, 2015; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993, 2007; Inglehart and 
Rabier, 1978; Inglehart and Reif, 1991; Toshkov, 2011). This is problematic, for two reasons. First, 
in order to know whether or how public opinion matters, we need to establish exactly what the 
public is telling pollsters. Second, it is difficult to know whether public support is high or low if we 
lack benchmarks based on its evolution over extended periods of time. Thus, we need to, first, 
understand how people respond to questions about Europe; second, we need to establish their 
empirical content and diagnose their dynamic properties. 
 
Conceptualizing and measuring support for Europe: A historical perspective 
To date, studies of the dynamics of aggregate support for Europe have taken a broadly 
similar approach with regard to conceptualization and measurement. Typically, this has involved 
the following steps: to define theoretically that the variable of interest is support for Europe; to 
suggest that this is a latent variable that is not observed directly; and to further assume that answers 
to the particular survey item are observed as various thresholds to the unobserved latent variable are 
crossed (e.g. Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1996; Bølstad, 2015; Dalton and Duval, 1986; Eichenberg 
and Dalton, 1993, 2007; Gabel, 1998; Gabel and Palmer, 1995; Inglehart and Reif, 1991; Janssen, 
1991; Norris, 1999; Toshkov, 2011; Wessels, 2007). 
This approach is simple but potentially problematic. As Hobolt and De Vries note, “[j]ust 
as most studies have paid relatively little attention to the conceptualization of support for European 
integration, the precise measurement of public attitudes toward European integration has also 
received somewhat limited consideration” (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 416). To the extent that 
they have discussed conceptualization and measurement, researchers have typically appealed to 
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face validity or have relied on Easton’s categories of diffuse and specific support when justifying 
the use of survey items (Easton, 1965; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). The trouble with the 
former approach is that alternative tests of validity have received limited attention. The trouble with 
the latter is that it may overly stretch the original concept (Goertz, 2006; Sartori, 1970). 
In retrospect, the advent of the Eurobarometer surveys in the 1970s may have contributed 
to these practices. While these surveys became an indispensable resource for students of European 
public opinion and political behavior, they also had unintended consequences for scholarship on 
support for Europe. First, by providing a set of readily-available indicators that, at first glance, 
seemed tailor-made to measure support “[…] these expanding data sets were used to achieve 
greater analytical precision and more substantial empirical evidence [...]. However in doing so, the 
variables of interest were adjusted to fit the needs of the analysis […]” (Loveless and 
Rohrschneider, 2011: 8). Put simply, survey items were often “retrofitted” to suit the analysis. 
Moreover, because the Eurobarometer was among the few survey projects that provided 
researchers with access to high quality, cross-national, individual-level data, scholars gravitated 
toward explaining individual-level and cross-sectional differences, rather than aggregate-level and 
intertemporal ones. As a consequence 
“Studies have employed a variety of measures to capture the empirical dynamics of 
support, such as trust in EU institutions, support for membership, or desired speed of 
integration. Most scholars rely on the Eurobarometer surveys because these constitute the 
only data source that allows for cross-national and longitudinal comparisons. One 
problematic issue, however, is that several questions have been reworded or excluded 
from the surveys, and hence very few questions cover the entire period since the early 
1970s. As a result, there is often a trade-off between analyses that rely on one or a small 
set of items to measure support over time and a cross-sectional analysis of various 
dimensions of support captured at a single point in time” (Hobolt and De Vries, 2016: 
416-417). 
 This trade-off may not be inevitable if we are able to identify a way to conceptualize and 
then measure support for Europe, and do so over extended periods of historical time. On a 
conceptual level, we posit that the nature of the European project and the history of European 
politics in the post-war period are such that it is sensible to presume that there is only one object of 
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support in the public mind in the early post-war decades. That is, rather than starting with the 
presumption of separable dimensions of attitudes toward European political objects, we assume one 
underlying (and possibly rather diffuse) predisposition for or against Europe. 
We define this general attitude of “support  (or ‘preference’) for European integration” as a 
positive orientation toward the object of European integration, as embodied in the actual process 
and institutions of the European Union and its predecessor organizations, starting with the Treaty of 
Paris. We use “support” and “preference” for European integration synonymously, with both 
intended to indicate a positive attitude. Similarly, we view both opposition and skepticisim as 
manifestations of a preference against integration (see also Hooghe and Marks, 2007). Above all, 
defined positively or negatively, support for, or opposition to, Europe is different from Eastonian 
system support. 
Our definition has empirical implications. At a basic level, it implies that attitudes people 
hold toward Europe are not well structured. The limited research that exists on the individual-level 
structure of Europe-related attitudes supports this view. Specifically, a small number of factor 
analyses of data collected at single points in time in the 1980s and 1990s have shown that 
individual-level support indicators load extremely highly on a single dimension (Gabel, 1998; 
Gabel and Anderson, 2002; see also McLaren, 2006).1 Even a basic factor analysis conducted fifty 
years ago on French and West German surveys from the 1950s shows that attitudes toward unifying 
Europe and membership in a European Confederation loaded extremely highly, and were clearly 
separate from factors such as Russia, the Cold War, or Security (Puchala, 1968).2 Separately, 
research has shown that citizens use heuristics to form opinions about Europe, rather than 
evaluating Europe on its own, specific terms (Pannico, 2017; see also Anderson, 1998; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2005). 
At the aggregate level, we expect that the early integration efforts that created the European 
Coal and Steel Community and then the European Economic Communities initiated a process that 
is reflected in the pattern of opinions across European publics. Because this process evolved for 
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several decades before the EU existed as the differentiated political system we know today, there 
may be significant path dependency in aggregate support patterns. At a minimum, it suggests the 
possibility that aggregate opinion about Europe is anchored differently in each country and evolves 
gradually from there – or, to use statistical language, that opinions may vary in the short- and 
medium-term as a function of the politics and economics of European integration, but that there are 
strong intercept and socialization effects over the very long-term. 
 The idea that the formation and trajectory of attitudes about Europe are endogenous to the 
particular time and conditions surrounding entry into the European project is also consistent with 
what we know about countries’ decisions to formally join the integration process (for an example, 
see Diez-Medrano, 2003). Not only were the publics in countries that joined the Union early more 
supportive of the integration process than those that chose to stay out or join later, but also, by 
joining, countries started on and then travelled down the path of integration from different starting 
points. Publics’ preferences regarding Europe emanate from these unique historical experiences, 
with membership and participation in European politics creating distinct approaches to “Europe.” 
 
Measuring historical public opinion 
In simple terms, then, there are two ways for people to respond to survey questions about 
Europe. The first is that they have separable and separate ways of thinking about Europe. The 
second is that people respond either with general, not to say vague, considerations in mind. The 
latter would be equivalent to a “latent variable underlying the observed responses to survey 
questions […]. It would be a general response to government, not domain specific” (Stimson, 2005: 
4). Identifying such a latent variable, if indeed it exists, requires sample surveys. Ideally, these 
would ask identical questions, covering all conceivable dimensions of support, in all member states 
and for the entire period since the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
While there is no set of surveys that meets all of these conditions, we were able to collect 
historical opinion data measuring various aspects of support for Europe from four survey projects 
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conducted in Europe since World War II. These span the period from the formal inception of the 
integration project in 1952 to 2017 in several of the original member states (France, Germany, and 
Italy) and the United Kingdom. 
 
Surveys used 
The earliest usable surveys were those conducted by the United States Information Agency 
in several of the original members of the European Coal and Steel Community (France, Germany, 
and Italy) and the United Kingdom beginning in 1952. These surveys, collected intermittently until 
1969, constitute the first effort to collect opinion data about politics in Europe on a cross-national 
basis (for a detailed description, see Merritt and Puchala, 1968). Importantly for our purposes, some 
questions were repeated in multiple surveys and provide insight into changes in Western European 
perspectives on public affairs (see also Isernia, 2008). 
Concurrently to the USIA, in 1962, the European Commission began polling publics in 
France, Germany, and the Benelux countries through the so-called “Attitudes Toward Europe” 
surveys, followed by a set of surveys referred to as the “European Communities Studies”, also 
conducted irregularly from 1970 until 1973. At that point, the Commission decided to institute the 
Eurobarometer surveys to collect opinion data in applicant and member states of today’s European 
Union (at least) twice a year. Combined, these sources provide us with public opinion data collected 
in several hundred national surveys in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK based on interviews with 
about 450,000 individual respondents over the entire period of European integration from 1952 to 
2017 (see the Online appendix for details on measures and data sources). 
 
Data and measures 
For our analyses, we rely on those questions that were asked in at least 10 surveys over a 
period spanning at least 10 years. These include 14 questions about various aspects of the 
integration process and the European Union (or its predecessor organizations). Importantly, these 
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include questions that tap into different dimensions of support and the integration process. They 
include measures of undifferentiated support objects – support for unifying Europe and optimism 
about the future of the EU, for instance – as well as specific ones, including whether people think 
their country has benefitted from membership, whether EU democracy works well, or whether they 
trust the European Parliament and Court of Justice. 
Researchers have used some of these questions widely over the years – for instance, the 
questions about unifying Europe and membership – but not all have been asked in all countries in 
every survey, and some, like trust in the European Central Bank, were asked for only relatively 
brief periods of time. This means that these time series form a patchwork quilt of survey items that 
cover the entire history of the integration project, but also that there is not a single question 
covering the entire period since 1952 (the questions and the time periods covered by them are 
shown in Table A.1. in the Online appendix). 
 
Analysis 
 To make use of these disparate sources of historical opinion series, we need a way of 
knitting them together and identifying the common dynamic elements from multiple indicators 
across surveys. To do so, we rely on Stimson’s dyad ratios algorithm, which has been widely used 
by students of public opinion in a variety of domains (Stimson, 1999, 2004). The algorithm extracts 
the common dynamic elements by focusing on the relative changes within an item rather than their 
absolute values. It is thus analogous to conducting a factor analysis on time series data. It calculates 
how the marginals for each question asked in each survey change over time, extracts the latent 
dimensions underlying the shared patterns of variance across these changes, and produces the 
relevant number of series of public opinion data. 
We proceed in several steps. First, we estimate the extent to which attitudes about Europe 
share an underlying, latent construct over time. Second, we examine its content and generate 
measures of support for integration for the countries investigated here. We then investigate their 
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evolution since 1952 and examine their trajectories since the beginning of the integration project. 
Finally, we examine whether the structural break implied by the literature on European integration 
is reflected in the data and discuss the potential implications of trends in the data for the politics of 
EU governance and integration. 
 
One dimension or two? 
To establish the dimensionality of support, we start by analyzing two periods: first, one that 
comprises all surveys we have assembled for the entire history of integration between 1952 and 
2017; second, the period that includes all surveys conducted by the Eurobarometer since 1973.3 To 
see if the items separate into recognizable factors indicating diffuse or specific constructs, or 
perhaps factors measuring support for institutions versus the process of integration, we instructed 
the algorithm to look for two dimensions (for more information on the analyses, see the Online 
appendix). Table 1 reports the Eigenvalue estimates for both periods, as well as the proportions of 
variance in the latent variable explained by each factor. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The results indicate a dominant first dimension in all four countries. Eigenvalues are 
always greater than 1 on the first dimension, ranging between 2.54 (UK) and 3.21 (Italy) for the 
entire 1952-2017 period and 3.64 (UK) and 4.34 (Italy) for the 1973-2017 period, with France and 
Germany in-between. Equally important, Eigenvalue estimates for a possible second factor are 
lower than 1 on the second dimension in six of the eight analyses. While the highest Eigenvalue 
estimates on the second dimension reach 1.01 and 1.05 in France and Italy, respectively, in the 
1973-2017 period, the estimates for the first dimension are more than four times as large. Taken 
together, these results suggest at best a minor role for a second dimension. 
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This is also reflected in the amount of variance explained by each of the factors. Results 
show that the first factor explains most of the variance in the support series in all four countries, 
accounting for somewhere between 75% of the variance in Italy to 61% in the UK for the 1952-
2017 period. Similarly, it explains between 72.5% (Italy) and 62% (UK) for the four-plus decades 
since 1973, with France and Germany ranging between 66 and 71%. Thus, the first factors explain 
between two thirds and three fourths of the variance in the underlying construct – numbers that 
compare favorably to other applications of the algorithm in public opinion research. 
Again, there is a hint of a second dimension in the percentages of the variance explained by 
each factor, with the second factor accounting for a small proportion of the variance in aggregate 
opinion. The variance explained by the second factor ranges between 10% (Germany 1973-2017) 
and 19% (UK, 1952-2017). Perhaps equally noteworthy, the patterns of results are uniform across 
the four countries, with one dominant first dimension accounting for the lion’s share of variation in 
the underlying opinion series. 
Taken together, the patterns of Eigenvalues and variance explained lead to the baseline 
inference that, when considered over the long run of post-war history, and regardless of whether we 
use the entire period or solely the period since the inception of the Eurobarometer, public support 
for Europe is essentially one-dimensional.  Moreover, despite some variations in Eigenvalues 
across countries, this pattern holds in every country investigated here. This lends consistent support 
to the notion that the preference for Europe that lies at the core of public opinion is unidimensional. 
 
The content of aggregate opinion across countries 
 What, then, is the substantive content of this core dimension, and how much commonality 
is there in factor loadings across countries? Put another way: while there may be one core 
dimension of aggregate support, does this mean that the content of the underlying latent construct 
series is similar across countries? To answer these questions, we report the factor loadings for the 
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1952-2017 period in Figure 3 (those for the 1973-2017 period are largely identical and shown in the 
Online appendix). 
They reveal that around 10 of the 14 indicators load extremely highly in each of the four 
countries, with several of them exceeding 0.90. Thus, the first inference to be drawn from the 
results is that, collectively, these items capture the core support dimension well and encompass a 
wide variety of reported attitudes. Moreover, there is a common set of items that load extremely 
highly in all of the countries investigated here. Using a 0.7 loading as a cut-off, these items include 
support for EU membership, assessments of the benefits from membership, regret if the EU were 
scrapped, appraisal of the EU’s image, and trust in the European Parliament, the European 
Commission, and the European Central Bank. These findings suggest that the core preference for 
Europe is about membership in the EU and benefits from it, alongside judgments about the 
trustworthiness of key institutions and a general view of the EU’s image. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Beyond this shared pattern, two items load highly in some but not all countries. Optimism 
about the future of the EU is a key component of the preference for Europe in France, Germany, 
and Italy – with factor loadings in excess of 0.9 in Italy and Germany – but not the UK, where the 
factor loading is also positive but only about half the size (0.47). The factor for the item measuring 
people’s satisfaction with the performance of EU democracy is positive in all four countries, but 
quite low in France and Italy (~ 0.3) and the UK (0.48), while it loads highly in Germany (0.77). 
 Finally and in contrast, the items measuring the desired speed of integration and attachment 
to Europe show less consistent performance across countries and contribute to the preference for 
Europe only in some member states. Attachment to Europe loads positively and extremely highly in 
Italy (0.92), but has a sizable and negative loading in Germany (-.58), is essentially zero in France, 
and middling and positive in the UK (0.44). Interestingly, the desired speed of integration seems to 
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have the least in common with the underlying preference for Europe. The factor loading is modestly 
negative in one country (France), not significantly greater than zero in another (UK), and only has a 
very modest and positive loading in Germany and Italy (0.31 and 0.16, respectively). 
 Thus, a number of common core items form the basis of the preference for Europe, with 
some additional features rounding out the national factors – for example, with attachment to Europe 
and optimism about Europe mattering a great deal in Italy. Taken together, we find that the 
underlying preference is not simply an amalgam of all the different questions related to Europe. 
Importantly, too, not all items load strongly on the underlying factor, suggesting that satisfaction 
with EU democracy or the desired speed of integration do not contribute much to the dominant 
dimension underlying a preference for Europe. 
 We draw the following conclusions: First, the data reveal a single dominant dimension 
underlying aggregate opinions about Europe; second, support is captured by a broad set of 
indicators and consistently so; third, while there are cross-national differences in the factor loadings, 
these are less pronounced than the commonality in loadings in each of the countries.4 While this is 
the case when we pool all data for the entire period or examine only the Eurobarometer data, these 
results cannot speak to the issue of whether the underlying structure has changed over time, and 
especially since the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht. This is a question we turn to next. 
 
The Maastricht Treaty: A structural break? 
 To examine whether the structure of support has changed over time, we estimated the 
extent to which the set of indicators loads differently before and after 1992. In particular, we are 
interested in whether public opinion has become more differentiated following the growth and 
evolution of the integration process. Specific and generic attitudes may well have been closely 
aligned during the early decades of integration. Over time however, and to the extent that the 
European political system has become differentiated, the structure of aggregate opinions may have 
become more differentiated as well. 
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To address this question, we repeated the analysis undertaken for the entire period 
separately for the pre- and post-Maastricht periods; the results are shown in Table 2. They confirm 
a single dominant dimension before and after Maastricht. While the second factor achieves higher 
Eigenvalues after 1992, so does the first dimension, with all Eigenvalues consistently higher in the 
post-1992 period. However, despite this increase in Eigenvalues across the board, the estimates for 
the second dimension are always significantly lower than for the first dimension. We interpret this 
to indicate that the pattern of results for the pre- and post-Maastricht periods points to a dominant 
first dimension and a weaker or non-existent second dimension.5 
To provide further context for this result, it is instructive to consider the Eigenvalue 
estimates alongside the variance explained by each dimension. The results show that the variance 
explained by the first dimension is largely similar in Italy and Germany in both periods, while it is 
reduced in France and the UK after 1992. Further investigation of the factor loadings in these 
countries did not reveal any patterns that would indicate significant changes in the factor structure 
before and after Maastricht. Thus, there is only limited evidence that the factor structure changed 
after 1992. At the same time, we do not see strong evidence that Maastricht fundamentally changed 
the underlying core of aggregate opinions about Europe. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
 
The dynamics of support over the long run 
Based on the factor loadings discussed above, the dyad ratios algorithm generates a 
measure of support for Europe in each of the countries. This measure represents the dynamics of the 
single latent construct over time, and it therefore takes into account the country-specific loadings 
reported above. Below, we investigate its trajectory since 1952.6 
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Seeing the forest for the trees 
To evaluate the evolution of support, we start with a visual inspection of the series. Figure 
4 plots support between 1952 and 2017 for all countries jointly; to further identify specific national 
patterns, we also plot each country’s series separately (Figure 5). The graphs show several 
noteworthy patterns. First, Figure 4 demonstrates that long-term support levels are high in three of 
the four countries we investigate, with average support in the mid-60s (France: 65.4, Germany: 
66.5) and even 70 (Italy: 70.1). The one obvious exception is the UK, with a long-run average of 
44.5. Thus, averaged over the span of six decades, the Italians were the biggest Euro-enthusiasts, 
with France and Germany not too far behind, while the UK’s scores on the preference for Europe 
were never consistently positive. 
A second noticeable feature of the series is that, for several decades following World War 
II and up until the late 1980s support levels fluctuate at high levels around their long-standing 
means in France and Germany; this is most obvious in the country-by-country graphs shown in 
Figure 5. Similarly, Italians rapidly discovered their taste for Europe in the 1950s and by the mid-
1960s, their support trajectory, too, is locked into a high and steady level of support very similar to 
France and Germany (see also Isernia, 2008). 
However, the trends also reveal significant changes in support in France, Germany, and 
Italy over the past three decades, as historically high levels of support have gradually trended 
downward to a point where positive and negative opinions are virtually tied. In fact, France, 
Germany, and Italy all exhibited peaks in support in the mid-1960s and then again, at a slightly 
lower level, in the late 1980s (Italy and France) and early 1990s (Germany), after which it declined. 
Interestingly, support in Germany picked up again in the late 1990s and has remained relatively 
stable, while support in France and Italy has been on a continued path of long-term decline. 
We confirmed these conjectures with the help of supplementary regression analyses that 
estimated support as a function of linear and curvilinear trend variables (year and year squared). 
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These indicate that the best functional form for the French and Italian series includes highly 
significant linear and curvilinear coefficients; the coefficient of determination shows that they 
jointly explain 81% and 83% of the variance in the series. In contrast, the best functional form for 
the German series includes a simple linear and negative trend, which accounts for 71% of the 
variation in the series (a regression including a curvilinear term does not increase the R-squared and 
renders both coefficients insignificant). 
UK public opinion offers a very different picture (see also Bølstad, 2015). After an initial 
high of support for a unified Europe in the mid-1950s, British enthusiasm went on the wane for 
well over two decades, punctured by temporary and minor rallies in the mid-1960s and, at a lower 
level, the mid-1970s. After hitting the nadir in 1980 and 1981, support climbed steadily through the 
1980s into the early 1990s, after which it went on a slide again, alongside the other countries, only 
to accelerate between 2007 and 2013. Ironically, in light of the country’s decision to exit the EU, 
UK opinion toward Europe has recovered significantly since 2013 and to levels not too far below 
those of France and Italy. Clearly, though, the dynamics of UK opinion stand apart from the other 
major European states: it has displayed consistently lower levels of support since the 1950s, and has 
been consistently more prone to fluctuation than support in France, Germany, and Italy. Thus, UK 
opinion is perhaps best described as ambivalent in the long run and more volatile in the short-term. 
 
[Figures 4 and 5 about here] 
 
Combined with the factor loadings discussed above, the dynamics of support across the 
four countries suggest that there is a basic core of support that is differentiated by country rather 
than time period. That is, while the content of the preference for Europe may not have changed 
significantly over time and is similar across countries, there are distinct country-specific trends in 
its trajectories over time. To use statistical language, the core of Britain’s preference for Europe is 
not fundamentally different from France’s, Germany’s, and Italy’s, but its intercept has been 
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consistently lower over the last six decades. This finding speaks to the importance of recognizing 
that inferences about whether support is high or low, or whether it has changed appreciably over 
time, are potentially subject to selection bias. Thus, using data from 1973 to 1993, Anderson and 
Kaltenthaler (1996) report, for example, that support had increased over time, while Down and 
Wilson (2008) and Eichenberg and Dalton (2007) seek to explain the decline in support in the 
1990s. What one sees indeed depends on when one looks; taking the long historical view helps to 
clarify the baselines for each nation’s level of support. 
 Further formal analyses of the dynamic properties of the EU support time-series – and in 
particular whether the series are stationary – provide mixed results (see the Online appendix). 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that the UK series is stationary, whereas those in the other 
three countries are not. The results from further Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS)	
tests corroborate this conclusion for France and Italy. In these countries, stationarity is clearly 
rejected; turned around, it confirms that the Italian and French series do not have a constant mean 
and variance over the period we investigate, a fact that is reflected in the downward trend since the 
1980s that shows little sign of abating. In contrast, the results for the German and British support 
series are more equivocal, though the UK comes closest to exhibiting a level of support that acts 
like an anchor to which opinion inevitably returns after moving up or down over time. 
 
Discussion 
 The scholarly literature on the role of public opinion in the European integration process is 
divided between those who believe that public support for Europe matters, those who believe it 
does not, and those who think it can, might, or should. It is difficult to adjudicate among these 
competing perspectives absent a more systematic conceptualization of support for Europe or when 
extensive knowledge about its dynamics is in relatively short supply. To help close these gaps, we 
developed a conceptualization of support for Europe as unidimensional, positing that a more 
appropriate model of the survey response presumes one general belief about Europe, rather than a 
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set of domain-specific ones. We subsequently examined the utility of this conceptualization of 
support with the help of data collected in four member states of the European Union. 
Capitalizing on an original dataset of survey questions related to support for integration 
since 1952, we investigated the nature of the underlying construct – support for integration – over 
the entire time period of integration since the Treaty of Paris. The results indicate that support is 
best characterized as a unidimensional construct, and that this support construct has similar 
characteristics across countries. Based on these analyses, we constructed country-level time series 
of public support for integration and examined its trajectory over the past 65 years. 
We find that support fluctuates around a steady long-term mean in one country: the UK. In 
another two (France and Italy), support for Europe approaches an inverted U-shape over the 
historical long run: support rises in the 1950s and 1960s, plateaus in the 1970s and 1980s, and then 
starts a steady decline in the 1990s. In the German case, we observe high levels of support 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a very gradual long-term decline since the 1970s to 
what looks to be a relatively stable, but lower, level of support in the 2000s. 
These analyses have empirical and theoretical implications. On an empirical level, knowing 
whether support is primarily unidimensional is important for making sense of the mountains of 
public opinion data about Europe accumulated since the end of World War II. Among others, it is 
good news for existing scholarship, as it suggests the partial adequacy of using different (single) 
survey questions as indicators of support, so long as these are treated as incomplete measures of a 
larger underlying syndrome and are not taken too literally. In particular, the indicators identified as 
loading highly in Figure 3 can all give a good, but incomplete indication of support. These include 
the most commonly used survey measures like membership in the European Union or benefits from 
it, but also less commonly used items such as people’s sense of the EU’s image or trust in key EU 
institutions. 
In addition, by amalgamating various support measures, we now have a method for 
comparing measures of support today to support thirty, forty, or fifty years ago, and it would be 
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useful to produce additional series for other countries to potentially confirm these results and 
expand the universe of member states that can be compared and examined. Our approach thus 
offers a way to construct one consistent measure that can be extended into the present time with 
every new wave of the Eurobarometer. This opens the possibility of examining the relationship 
between public opinion and the process of integration over the long historical run and across 
member states – a question that previously has been investigated with a shorter time series and 
single item support indicators (e.g. Bølstad, 2015; Franklin and Wlezien, 1997; Toshkov, 2011). 
This also would provide a broader and longer set of data points that could be used to 
investigate the question of whether there is a “Europe-wide European mood”. Based on the 
conventional membership question, a study by Bølstad (2015) has already provided evidence that 
the core EU countries – which include France, Germany, and Italy – follow one trend, while others 
on the periphery – the main one being the UK – follow a different pattern of support for Europe. 
Further analysis of co-movement in public opinion across member states may help shed light on 
whether a European demos is emerging. 
There are several potential limitations to our analyses and results. In particular, there may 
be a trade-off between gauging opinion over a longer historical period on one hand – one of our 
primary goals in this paper – and achieving measurement and estimation precision on the other. Our 
dataset includes fewer items in the pre-Eurobarometer period, and this may produce a bias in favor 
of a single dimension. At the same time, the smaller the number of items used in the analysis, the 
poorer may be our ability to capture the underlying construct reliably. If reliability is compromised, 
our results that include the earlier periods should be less well behaved. 
In the end, there is little that can be done to the measurement and reliability issues directly 
because we are limited by the historical data available to us. However, to the extent that earlier and 
later surveys move together, we can be more certain that these items jointly capture similar things. 
Our results indicate that they do, with items available during the earliest period among the highest-
loading ones across the different time periods. In addition, the shorter period (1973-2017) can act as 
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a check on the robustness of the results for the entire 1952-2017 time series. The analysis of the 
subset produces results that are largely similar in terms of demonstrating a dominant first 
dimension; future research should investigate the trade-off between precision and dimensionality of 
support further. 
Another limitation has to do with our conceptualization and the focus on measures that can 
be taken to indicate support for “Europe,” the European idea, and EU political system, or using only 
indicators that are included in a minimum of 10 surveys over at least a decade. As such, we ignore 
potentially interesting dimensions of support; for example, more specific or policy-related questions 
about the scope of a European government relative to member states. Nor did we investigate 
whether the support measures used in the analysis are more likely to tap into what so-called 
“relative” support (see e.g. Franklin and Wlezien, 1997, Soroka and Wlezien, 2010). To the extent 
that people’s opinions about the desired speed of integration indicate a relative rather than absolute 
preference, the item’s loading (or lack thereof, see Figure 3) might suggest that the dominant 
dimension taps into people’s absolute preference for Europe. 
 Theoretically, our analyses set the stage for mapping out a better understanding of the role 
public opinion plays in the integration process. The nature of support documented above – when 
combined with high levels of support – is consistent with the original meaning of the “permissive 
consensus” notion derived from Key’s (1961) idea of a “permissive opinion distribution”. Like ours, 
Key’s formulation of aggregate support patterns did not presuppose an indifferent public or a 
particular kind of support, but a public where the plurality was generally supportive of a set of 
policies (see also Sinnott, 1995). This idea is virtually identical to what Stimson (1991) has called a 
“zone of acquiescence” – where the public will accept a range of specific outcomes. 
Our results indicate that such a zone of acquiescence has never really existed in Britain, 
though there it has been present in the other member states examined here for much of the time 
since World War II. This is consistent with the history of integration; it would also help provide one 
explanation for Brexit originating in public support, or lack thereof. As our results show, with brief 
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historical exceptions – most notably the 1950s and early 1990s – Britons consistently have been 
less enthusiastic about Europe, possibly due to a weak sense of European identity (Evans, Carl, and 
Dennison, 2018). At the same time, this consensus may be fraying even in stalwart member states 
like France and Italy where support has been eroding and has yet to show signs of plateauing. 
 In the end, then, if we want to establish more conclusively whether public opinion about 
Europe “matters”, our reconceptualized measure of support – available for a sufficient number of 
countries and over a sufficient length of time – provides an important piece of the puzzle. In future 
analyses, it would be important to focus on support for integration as an independent variable to 
explain political outcomes at national and European levels. Knowing what support for Europe is 
and how it works is only the first but critical step in that direction. 
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Notes	
1 Gabel’s (1998) work is the most detailed and thorough. He posits and seeks to establish construct 
validity of an Eastonian conceptualization of support with the help of individual-level survey 
responses to five questions asked in the October 1985 Eurobarometer survey in the then 10 member 
states of the European Community (EC). Gabel’s results show that all variables load highly on the 
first dimension. However, he also reports that a two-dimensional model that allows for the two 
factors to be correlated fits the data better than a simple one-dimensional model (using Bentler-
Bonnet fit indices as the deciding criterion). He concludes that his single factor (uni-dimensional) 
model is less appropriate for measuring support for European integration than a two-dimensional 
model. 
2 See also McLaren, 2006, Chapter 2. Using the Mannheim cumulative Eurobarometer trend file, 
McLaren shows that support for unification and EU membership are highly related across all 
member states; using the two Eurobarometer surveys from 2000, she shows that support for 
unification and people’s preference for the EU are as highly correlated as support for membership 
and support for unification. 
3 By analyzing these two sets of time series, we sought to examine whether results were sensitive to 
the inclusion of data from the 1950s and 1960s, a period during which fewer surveys were 
conducted and the potential for finding evidence of only one dimension was greatest. 
4 Only two of the second dimensions reach Eigenvalues that suggest some kind of coherence (> 1). 
Closer inspection of the loadings for these two cases (France and Italy 1973-2017) indicates that 
these loadings are essentially reproductions of the first dimension. Thus, we do not attribute 
separate, or separable, theoretical or empirical meaning to these second dimensions. 
5 The increase in Eigenvalues for the first and the second dimensions may be due to the richer array 
of data and perhaps more reliable measurement of the latent variable by multiple indicators in the 
later decades, which strengthens the Wcalc algorithm’s ability to identify the underlying mood 
construct. 
6 Because the underlying survey items reflect the ratios of the percent of respondents providing a 
supportive answer over the total of positive and negative responses, it ranges from 0 to 100. We 
multiplied the ratio by 100 for ease of interpretation. Higher values indicate more supportive 
attitudes and are interpretable as the percentage of positive opinions relative to all directional 
(positive plus negative) ones. 
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			Figure 1. Attitudes Toward European Unification (October 1954 USIA Survey) 
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Figure 2. Support for European Unification,1954-57 (USIA Surveys, October 1954, February 1955, 
November 1955, April 1956, November 1956, May 1957, with fieldwork varying by country.) 
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Figure 3. Preference For Europe Factor Loadings (1952-2017)
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Figure 4. Public Support for European Integration in Four Countries, 1952-2017 
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Figure 5. Preferences For Europe, 1952-2017
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Table 1. Dimensionality in Support for European Integration, 1952-2017 
 
 
 
 FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK 
 Factor Factor Factor Factor 
Period 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
 
1952-2017 
(all surveys) 
 
2.84 
(66.0) 
0.73 
(16.9) 
3.03 
(70.6) 
0.53 
(12.4) 
3.21 
(74.6) 
0.69 
(16.0) 
2.54 
(60.7) 
0.78 
(18.6) 
 
1973-2017 
(Eurobarometer) 
 
4.06 
(67.9) 
1.01 
(17.0) 
4.17 
(69.9) 
0.58 
(9.81) 
4.34 
(72.5) 
1.05 
(17.5) 
3.64 
(61.9) 
0.85 
(14.5) 
 
Notes: Entries are Eigenvalue estimates. Eigenvalues > 1 in bold. Numbers in parentheses indicate 
the % variance explained by each factor. Not all survey items are available or available in equal 
numbers during the two periods (1952-2017 and 1973-2017; see Table A.1 in the Online appendix). 
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Table 2. Dimensionality in Support for European Integration, Pre- and Post-Maastricht 
 
 
 FRANCE GERMANY ITALY UK 
 Factor Factor Factor Factor 
Period 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Pre-
Maastricht         
 
1973-1991 
 
2.24 
(69.8) 
0.41 
(12.9) 
2.18 
(68.0) 
0.37 
(11.4) 
2.35 
(73.1) 
0.35 
(11.0) 
2.35 
(76.9) 
0.42 
(13.8) 
 
Post-
Maastricht 
 
1992-2017 
 
 
 
 
3.99 
(49.8) 
 
 
 
1.73 
(21.6) 
 
 
 
5.14 
(64.5) 
 
 
 
1.13 
(14.1) 
 
 
 
6.11 
(76.4) 
 
 
 
1.02 
(12.8) 
 
 
 
4.66 
(58.8) 
 
 
 
1.08 
(13.6) 
 
Notes: Entries are Eigenvalue estimates. Eigenvalues > 1 in bold. Numbers in parentheses 
indicate the % variance explained by each factor. Not all survey items are available or available in 
equal numbers during the two periods (1952-2017 and 1973-2017; see Table A.1 in the Online 
appendix). 
  
 
